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Abstract
The research on entrepreneurship as an economic phenomenon often assumes its
desirability as a driver of economic development and growth. However, entrepre-
neurial talent can be allocated among productive, unproductive and destructive
activities. This allocation has important implications in the developing world, par-
ticularly for countries hosting conflict or recovering from conflict. The allocation of
entrepreneurship is theorized as driven by institutions. Although the trade-off
between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship has been examined,
destructive entrepreneurship has been largely ignored. We build from existing the-
ory and define destructive entrepreneurship as wealth destroying. We propose
three assumptions to develop a model of destructive entrepreneurship that presents
the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial talent behaves in this manner. We
present four key propositions on the nature and behavior of destructive entrepre-
neurship. We conclude by identifying research agendas and policy streams, with a
focus on relevance to conflict and postconflict recovery.
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4 Global Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Incentives
The allocation of a resource affects the quality and extent of its contribution to
the economy. As a resource, entrepreneurial talent affects the nature of economic
activities and their subsequent implications for growth (see Douhan and Henrekson,
2008a). Attempts to shed light on the dynamics of entrepreneurial talent have come
overwhelmingly from empirical perspectives, while less attention has been paid to
its theoretical foundations. Empirical approaches tend to build from an assumption
that entrepreneurship should be encouraged because of universal positive effects on
employment, wealth creation, and innovation.
However, the existence of entrepreneurial talent itself is not enough. Entrepre-
neurs do not consider externalities or societal effects when they work to increase
wealth, power, and prestige (Baumol 1990). Entrepreneurial talent is allocated to
activities ‘‘with the highest private returns, which need not have the highest social
returns’’ (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991, 506). It is not possible to make infer-
ences about externalities or overall social welfare effects. Universal ‘‘goodness’’ of
entrepreneurship is not implicit and activities can certainly exert questionable or
undesirable effects. Entrepreneurial talent can thus be allocated among a range of
choices with varying effects.
The determinants of this process in a country or region have roots in institutions.
Baumol (1990) theorizes the allocation of entrepreneurship as occurring among pro-
ductive, unproductive, and destructive forms. He considers productive entrepreneur-
ship as wealth-creating activity and unproductive entrepreneurship as redistributive
activity. Assuming a generally substantial role for entrepreneurs across societies, he
argues that entrepreneurial behavior responds to incentives (i.e, ‘‘the rules of the
game’’) set by institutions, which are subject to change in any given institutional
context. Similarly, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) distinguish between entre-
preneurship and rent-seeking and that find rent-seeking rewards talent more than
entrepreneurship in many contexts. In their approach, the trade-off is between entre-
preneurship (starting firms that innovate and foster growth) and rent-seeking (redis-
tributing wealth and reducing growth). Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991, 1993)
treat entrepreneurship as distinct from rent-seeking; we favor a breakdown of entre-
preneurship to explicitly avoid treating it as universally desirable. Both Baumol
(1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) are consistent in their treatment
of incentive structures driving entrepreneurial choices.1 However, Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1991) make an additional, critical point: That increasing returns to abil-
ity will force entrepreneurship and rent-seeking activities to compete for the same
talent.
If the same actor could be engaged in such different entrepreneurial activities,
then the mechanisms through which talent is allocated have important implications
for economic outcomes. Some approaches treat rent-seeking (or unproductive entre-
preneurship) as a worst-case condition that threatens productive entrepreneurship
(for related work on rent-seeking, see also Nunn 2007; Grossman and Kim 1995).
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) find that rent-seeking negatively affects
growth through bureaucratic agents that stifle innovation. These effects prevent the
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proverbial ‘‘pie’’ from growing. Baumol’s discussion of destructive entrepreneur-
ship acknowledges the existence of a truly negative type of entrepreneurial activity.
However, existing perspectives do not fully address shrinking of the pie—that is,
what happens when entrepreneurial activity does not create or redistribute wealth but
actually destroys it. Bhagwati’s (1982) conception of directly unproductive, profit-
seeking (DUP) activities comprises rent-seeking as a subset and also introduces the
important consideration of reducing welfare. We extend Baumol’s discussion of the
allocation of entrepreneurship in a simple and intuitive manner, to define destructive
entrepreneurship as wealth destroying (such as the destruction of inputs for produc-
tion activities).
Theoretical work on destructive entrepreneurship is noticeably absent from the lit-
erature. Current understanding of entrepreneurship is thus incomplete, rendering exist-
ing knowledge inadequate. Empirical interest in the allocation of entrepreneurship is
growing (see, for example, Bowen and de Clerq 2008; Sobel 2008;Weitzel et al. 2010;
Urbig et al. 2012) yet is still a relatively young area of investigation. We argue that a
solid theoretical foundation is necessary to inform the development of rigorous empiri-
cal work, as with any other field of research. This is particularly important because of
the direct implications for public policies and economic development.2
In this article, we advance the literature by proposing a model of destructive
entrepreneurship. We use three important assumptions in our approach. First, we
assume constant supply but varying allocation of entrepreneurial talent. Second,
we assume that entrepreneurs can diminish inputs for production. Third, we assume
heterogeneity of entrepreneurs. Our assumptions allow us to shift the focus from the
productive/unproductive trade-off to destructive entrepreneurship.
In the next section, we present our assumptions and derive our model of destructive
entrepreneurship. In the third section, we briefly discuss incentives and the problems
of endogenous institutions in directing entrepreneurship. We present implications, out-
line key promising areas for further research, and conclude in the fourth section.
A Model of Destructive Entrepreneurship
Assumptions
We begin with three assumptions:
Assumption 1: The supply of entrepreneurial talent is constant but varies in its
allocation.
We accept Baumol’s proposition that the supply of entrepreneurs remains relatively
constant and assume that the same proportion of people will be entrepreneurs, but
their chosen activities can change. It is necessary to restate that entrepreneurship is not
by nature positive and that entrepreneurs operate to maximize utility. We view rent-
seekingwithin the spectrumof entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, we assume entrepre-
neurs are driven by rents, and this generally holds true across the range of allocation.
22 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
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Assumption 2: Entrepreneurs are able to diminish inputs for production.
Classic principal–agent models on externally financed ventures assume that entre-
preneurs are able to divert some of the venture’s proceeds for private use (e.g., Tirole
2006). In these models, the cash flows of a venture can be diverted, but the produc-
tive assets remain untouched. We include the possibility that entrepreneurs can also
misappropriate the productive inputs of a venture, effectively destroying the possi-
bility to generate revenues at all. This can be done in two ways. First, destructive
entrepreneurs can convince capitalists to invest into a venture and then find ways
to steal or misappropriate the committed funds or the fixed assets purchased with
them. Second, destructive entrepreneurs can simply raid any productive assets in
an economy, such as sources for production in extractive industries. Thus, instead
of convincing the capitalist to fund a productive venture, destructive entrepreneurs
devise ways to forcefully steal the assets from capitalists, irrespective of the latter’s
investment decision. We analyze both types of destructive entrepreneurs in our
model, allowing us to explain a range of activities occurring during conflicts and
other forms of political instability as well some criminal activity.
Assumption 3: Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous.
Even if all entrepreneurs are born with exactly the same entrepreneurial talent, it is
likely that they differ in many other aspects. This heterogeneity can result from vary-
ing degrees of training or skills, different levels of patience (discount factors),
endowments of other talents, or from differences in access to markets or to facilitat-
ing networks. This heterogeneity may not influence the entrepreneurial talent per se
but affects the magnitude and choice of possible returns once the talent is employed
(for a related discussion, refer to Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991). In less-
developed economies, additional training, initial endowments and the urgency for
quick returns play a particularly important role in the success of entrepreneurial
activities, as well as constitute dimensions with significant heterogeneity and polar-
ization. To integrate this aspect, we assume that entrepreneurs expect different pay-
offs from their activities. For simplicity, we model this assumption by specifying
different levels of patience (discount factors) for entrepreneurs, but other character-
istics that motivate heterogeneous project returns are also possible.
Together, these three assumptions shift the lens from productive and unproduc-
tive entrepreneurship to destructive entrepreneurship.
Framework
The basic framework for the model of destructive entrepreneurship builds upon the
work of Tirole (2006), who employs a simplified version of the model by Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). The starting point of the model is that any entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity will require a fixed investment I , which the entrepreneur cannot fully finance
internally. Let us assume the entrepreneur would like to exploit an opportunity.
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Initially, the entrepreneur has assets A < I : Since he must access external capital, he
will approach a capitalist for the amount I � A > 0.3 If undertaken, the activity will
yield a verifiable income R > 0.
Based on this framework, we assume that the entrepreneur has two types di, which
can be interpreted as different levels of impatience. This reflects the notion of hetero-
geneity between entrepreneurs. The capitalist believes that the types di are indepen-
dent and only have two possible values: di ¼ d is an impatient entrepreneur with a
low discount factor and dþ D is a patient entrepreneur with a high discount factor,
with D > 0. The capitalist believes p is the probability that di equals dþ D and that
ð1� pÞ is the probability that di equals d. Thus, p corresponds to the proportion of
patient entrepreneurs in the market. Only the entrepreneur knows his type di, however.
The contract between the capitalist and the entrepreneur stipulates if the activity
will be financed, and, further, how the profit will be shared between the capitalist
and the entrepreneur. It can be proven more rigorously that no positive transfer from
the capitalist to the entrepreneur will be specified.
If the activity is successful, the two parties share the profit, R, such that RL goes to
the capitalist and R� RL ¼ RE goes to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s limited
liability implies that both sides will receive 0 in case of failure. The capitalist’s claim
can but need not be interpreted as debt. In fact, the outside financing can take the
form of either debt or equity.4 For simplicity, however, we present the model only
in terms of debt financing.
An entrepreneur of type i will earn diRE. The patient entrepreneur will earn dis-
counted profit ðdþ DÞRE > dRE, with 0 � dþ D � 1, if I � A has been invested
into the productive venture. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can behave destructively
and misappropriate the investment of the capitalist. In this case, he keeps his assets A
and earns a destructive profit lðI � AÞ from the capitalist’s investment. Here,
l represents a specific, exogenously given institutional environment, for example,
the quality of rule of law in a country. If l is high, a weak institutional climate allows
a destructive entrepreneur to appropriate a high share of the capitalist’s investment.
A low l represents a stronger institutional environment, where destructive entrepre-
neurship is less profitable.
The zero profit constraint of the capitalist (e.g., due to competition) can bewritten as
pRL ¼ I � A:
The rate of interest i is implicitly given by
RL ¼ ð1þ iÞðI � AÞ: ð1Þ
If the activity is not financed, the entrepreneur still holds his original assets A and the
capitalist still holds her original assets I � A. To make things interesting (and for
many countries also more realistic), we assume that the two types of entrepreneurs
also have different incentives. Consistent with our theory, these incentives are
determined by the institutional conditions represented by l. The strength of the
24 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
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institutional environment determines the benefits of selling/consuming the misap-
propriated assets as a fraction l of their original value, or, alternatively, the costs
(1 � l) of misappropriation. We thus assume that the patient entrepreneur prefers
to invest the external capital into the productive venture, with ðdþ DÞRE � Aþ
lðI � AÞ, while the impatient entrepreneur prefers to behave destructively, because
dRE < Aþ lðI � AÞ: Thus, the impatient entrepreneur will earn the destructive
profit lðI � AÞ.
This can be interpreted as economic inequality where one type needs the profits
out of the project much earlier than the other, and in the extreme, right away by steal-
ing them once invested. As an alternative to different discount factors, we could also
assume that the two types of entrepreneurs expect different profits (Rhi and Rlo). For
instance, one entrepreneur may be less skilled or educated and therefore expects a
much lower profit R from the venture than a more educated/skilled entrepreneur.
Although it is not the discount factor that is heterogeneous, but the return R (private
knowledge to the entrepreneur) that entrepreneurs expect from the project, the
results would be qualitatively similar.
Note that the entrepreneur’s action is observable but not contractible. The
contract is contingent on the project’s return (under productive entrepreneurship),
but the capitalist’s investment I � A is always assumed to be exposed to misappro-
priation once the contract is signed. This assumption depends on the institutional
framework and may particularly apply to environments with weak institutions.
The Capitalist Analysis
In equilibrium, the capital will invest if
pRL � I � A
p � �p � I � A
RL
: ð2Þ
With respect to the interest rate of the capitalist, we can define critical levels of
p and i as
p � ~p � 1
1þ i, i > ~i �
1
p
� 1: ð3Þ
Note that the participation constraint is always satisfied for both types of entrepre-
neurs, because of whatever the two types do (behaving productively or destruc-
tively), they always earn more than their reservation utility A.
Furthermore, the incentive compatibility constraint is never satisfied for both
types if one of them is sufficiently impatient, because then dRE < Aþ lðI � AÞ,
which incurs a loss for the capitalist. This loss cannot be prevented by increasing
RE (reducing RL), because the capitalist’s zero-profit constraint (1) is assumed to
be binding.
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In order to fund the project and earn a potential return RL, the capitalist has to put
her money at risk, because she cannot draft a contract protecting her investment from
misappropriation by a very impatient entrepreneur. The capitalist also cannot specify
a contract (or a menu of contracts) that leads to self-selection of the two types of
entrepreneurs, because sufficiently impatient entrepreneurs would always accept the
contract and always choose to behave destructively.
As long as p < 1, there is some positive probability ð1� pÞ that the capitalist will
invest and face a destructive entrepreneur. Reflecting perceived risk, the capitalist
will ask for an interest rate based on the probability of meeting a patient versus
an impatient entrepreneur. This situation demonstrates how the relationship between
the capitalist and the entrepreneur can become embedded. On one hand, the higher
the probability of meeting an impatient entrepreneur, the higher the interest rate
charged by the capitalist. On the other hand, the higher the interest rate, the more
accepting is the capitalist of impatient entrepreneurs in the market.
Note that as a necessary condition for financing the activity, the entrepreneur’s
assets are greater than A:
I � pRL � A � A: ð4Þ
This condition corresponds to the established credit rationing models (see Holmstrom
and Tirole 1997; Tirole 2006) that demonstrate that the entrepreneur needs to invest
some level of necessary collateral A in order to receive any external investment. In equa-
tion (4), this critical level A is lower when the fraction p of patient entrepreneurs in the
market increases, or when the contractually specified loan to the capitalist increases.
In equation (4), this critical level A is also lower when the total investment nec-
essary for the activity decreases. By substituting RL ¼ R� RE into equation (4), we
can rearrange the condition to relate to the return on investment for the project5:
1� p R
I
� RE
I
 
¼
A
I
� A
I
: ð5Þ
For the given investment I , a decrease in return on investment R will increase the
entrepreneur’s necessary collateral A. Therefore, in less profitable markets, capitalists
will require entrepreneurs to provide higher collateral and tighten credit rationing. If
the entrepeneurs are less able to access external financing, they can shift toward higher
levels of impatience. This can, in turn, discourage capitalists from investing.
The Entrepreneur Analysis
In the following section, we derive the comparative static properties of the equili-
brium conditions from the perspective of the entrepreneur. In order to observe
productive and destructive entrepreneurship simultaneously, the following two
conditions need to be satisfied in equilibrium: ðdþ DÞRE � Aþ lðI � AÞ and A þ
lðI � AÞ > dRE: From these conditions, we can conclude the following proposition:
26 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
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Proposition 1: For all RE � RE � RE, productive and destructive entrepreneurship
coexist in equilibrium, with
Aþ lðI � AÞ
d
� RE > RE �
Aþ lðI � AÞ
ðdþ DÞ 8D > 0: ð6Þ
It follows that for all RE � RE, there will be only productive entrepreneurship, since
both types of entrepreneurs will prefer the profit from the productive activity. For
RE � RE, both types will prefer the profit from destructive entrepreneurship.
Thus, if returns from productive activities are very low, destructive entrepreneur-
ship will dominate and will even be pursued by the more patient entrepreneurs.
Above a certain level of project returns, however, it will be more profitable for
patient entrepreneurs to behave productively, although impatient entrepreneurs will
still be destructive unless an even higher level of productive returns is reached.
Next, we analyze how this interval is affected by changes in D. It is straightfor-
ward to see that while RE is independent of D, RE is a decreasing function of D:
qRE
qD
¼
q AþlðI�AÞðdþDÞ
 
qD
¼ � A� Alþ Ilð Þ
Dþ dð Þ2 < 0: ð7Þ
This allows us to formulate the following proposition on the heterogeneity of
entrepreneurs’ with regard to their patience:
Proposition 2: The larger the difference D of the entrepreneurs’ degree of
patience, the larger the interval in which both forms of entrepreneurship
coexist.
For arbitrary fixed vales of A; I ; l, and d, the following graph represents RE and RE
as functions of the difference D of the entrepreneur’s patience:
0
productive only
co-existence of productive 
and destructive
destructive only
RE
RE
RE
Δ
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The interval for RE, where productive and destructive entrepreneurship coexist,
increases in the difference in patience between the two entrepreneurs. Concurrently,
the interval for which only destructive entrepreneurship exists is decreasing. Intui-
tively, the patient entrepreneur’s incentive to behave destructively is reduced,
because his revenue from the activity increases with D. As the impatient entrepre-
neur’s incentives remain unchanged, the overall incentive to behave destructively
decreases in D.
Of course, the result that the interval, in which productive and destructive
activities coexist, increases in D, does not critically depend on the interpretation
of D as the difference in entrepreneurs’ patience. In principle, similar results can
be produced by any other type-specific characteristics that affect RE in a similar
manner and that motivate heterogeneous project returns across an entrepreneurial
talent base.6
To analyze the effect of destructive entrepreneurship on social welfare, we first
define welfare as the sum of all profits (i.e., of the capitalist, the productive entre-
preneur, and the destructive entrepreneur). If parameters are such that there is only
productive entrepreneurship, welfare will be given as
RL þ pðdþ DÞRE þ ð1� pÞRE: ð8Þ
Consider a situation in which the impatient entrepreneur is just indifferent between
investing productively and disappropriating the capitalist’s capital, thus RE ¼ RE. In
this situation, we know that for any R0E � RE, the impatient entrepreneur will
become destructive:
ð1� pÞdR0E � ð1� pÞðAþ lðI � AÞÞ; ð9Þ
and hence
RL þ pðdþ DÞRE þ ð1� pÞRE
� RL þ pðdþ DÞR0E þ ð1� pÞR0E
> pðRL þ ðdþ DÞR0E þ ð1� pÞðAþ lðI � AÞÞ þ ð1� pÞ0:
ð10Þ
The last inequality stems from the fact that even the smallest reduction in RE will, in
equilibrium, lead to misappropriation of the capital with probability (1 � p). Thus,
on the left-hand side, we have the first best solution for a given RE, while on the
right-hand side we have the equilibrium situation. Welfare reduction resulting from
destructive entrepreneurship is thus captured by the difference in welfare in these
two situations. Furthermore, we can add a term (1 � Z) for the opportunity cost
of the enforcement that is needed to recapture or protect the capitalist’s investment.
Intuitively, this is the foregone welfare from investing into, for example, law
enforcement activities to recapture stolen assets or prevent destructive activities,
instead of investing into alternative economic activities with higher welfare effects.
Note that the misappropriated fraction lðI � AÞ is welfare neutral. Welfare-relevant
28 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
Zoltán J. Ács - 9781784718046
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/19/2017 11:19:56AM
via communal account
12 Global Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Incentives
opportunity costs of enforcement imply that the residual fraction of the capitalist’s
investment, 1� lðI � AÞ, is wasted to some degree (1� Z) and is not entirely flow-
ing back to society (neglecting conservatively any positive externalities from the
project on society):
RL þ pðdþ DÞR0E þ ð1� pÞR0E
> pðRL þ ðdþ DÞR0E þ ð1� pÞððAþ lðI � AÞÞ þ ð1� lÞðZðI � AÞÞ
) RL þ dR0E > Aþ lðI � AÞ þ ð1� lÞZðI � AÞ:
ð11Þ
Using RL ¼ I � A, the last inequality can be rearranged to
I � Aþ dR0E > Aþ lðI � AÞ þ ð1� lÞZðI � AÞ
) ð1� ZÞð1� lÞðI � AÞ þ dR0E � A > 0:
ð12Þ
Interpreting this difference as the negative effect of the existence of destructive
entrepreneurship on social welfare, we can conclude the following:
Proposition 3: The effect of destructive entrepreneurship on social welfare is
negative. The negative effect of destructive entrepreneurship is the weaker, the
higher A, Z, and l. Larger d and RE increase (c.p.) the negative effects of
destructive entrepreneurship.
Thus, the more entrepreneurs (patient or impatient) are able to invest their own cap-
ital into the joint project (i.e., the higher A), the smaller are the negative effects on
welfare by destructive entrepreneurship. Intuitively, the wealthier entrepreneurs are,
and the less dependent on capitalists external investments, the less the potential
to (partially) destroy these funds (I � A). Further, we find that the more patient
both types of entrepreneurs are, the larger is the destructive impact on social
welfare. This result is driven by the fact that investment returns increase in
entrepreneurial patience, generating more profit and social welfare that can
potentially be destroyed.
Proposition 3 also states that social welfare is decreasing in two institutional
variables, l (absence of rule of law) as well as Z (proportion of assets that can be
‘‘saved’’ from total destruction). The greater the part of the misappropriated
investment that can be saved from being entirely destroyed in the process, Z(1 � l)
(I � A), the higher the social welfare. Analogously, the weaker the rule of
law, the more is the destructive entrepreneur able to consume (i.e., save) the
misappropriated investment, l(I � A), which would otherwise be destroyed
and wasted.
To provide more detail on the effects of the institutional environment and condi-
tion, we analyze how changes in the absence of rule of law l affect the interval
where both destructive and productive entrepreneurship coexist in equilibrium.
We first assume complete absence of rule of law. Comparative static properties show
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that both critical values RE and RE are increasing functions of l but that RE increases
with a larger slope:
RE and RE are increasing functions of l, but that RE increases with a larger
slope:
qRE
ql
¼ I � Að Þ
d
>
qRE
ql
¼ I � Að Þ
Dþ dð Þ > 0: ð13Þ
For arbitrary fixed values of A; I ; d, and D, the following graph represents RE and RE
as functions of the change in rule of law l:
0
RE
RE
RE
productive only
co-existence of
productive and destructive
destructive only
Absence of rule of law
We can summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The interval for RE, where productive and destructive entrepre-
neurship coexist, is increasing under weakened rule of law. The interval for
destructive entrepreneurship is also increasing.
Intuitively, the weaker rule of law increases the share of the external investment that
can be consumed. Accordingly, there is a greater incentive for both types of entrepre-
neurs to behave destructively, and there is lower incentive for capitalists to invest.
Raiding
Thus far, we assumed that only resources endogenously committed to the venture
can be misappropriated. In this extension of the model, we include the possibility
that the entrepreneur can also decide to raid resources not endogenously invested
by the capitalist. In the model so far, destructive entrepreneurship referred to a
situation where, for example, a capitalist decided to invest into a venture and the
entrepreneur (partner in the venture) decided to either steal or misappropriate the
committed funds and put them to suboptimal use (e.g., consume funds). The
30 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
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following extension also includes the case where the entrepreneur—instead of con-
vincing the capitalist to fund a productive venture—simply raids the capitalist’s
funds and consumes them.
Thus, there are two ways that destructive entrepreneurship may occur. First, the
entrepreneur can misappropriate the assets of the capitalist independently of the activ-
ity. The entrepreneur can engage in unproductive (redistributive) behavior and steal
assets mðI � AÞ from the capitalist for a payout of lmðI � AÞ. Second, the entrepre-
neur can misappropriate the assets of the capitalist during or within the activity. Given
this difference between forceful stealing outside and within the activity, we introduce
m as a distinct notation for the effectiveness of rule of law with regard to the proportion
of the capitalist’s assets that can be successfully raided. Analogously to the previous
setting, l denotes the strength of the institutional environment with regard to the costs
of raiding or the benefits of selling/consuming the raided assets.
This extension of our model incorporates the assumption of a ‘‘predator–prey’’
situation, which is employed in related models of conflict resolution and in the prop-
erty rights literature (see Bates, Greif, and Singh [2002] and Skaperdas [1992]). In
this situation, the investment consideration of the capitalist will be
pRL � pðI � AÞ þ ð1� pÞð1� mÞðI � AÞ
p � p^ � I � Að Þð1� mÞ
RL � mðI � AÞ : ð14Þ
In terms of the interest rate of the capitalist, we can also define the critical levels of p
and i as
p � p^ ¼ 1� m
1þ i� m, i � i^ �
1� mð Þ 1� pð Þ
p
: ð15Þ
A comparison to the threshold level ~i of the capitalist’s interest rate as defined in
equation (3) of the preceding analysis reveals that i^ < ~i:
i^ < ~i if
1� mð Þ 1� pð Þ
p
<
1
p
� 1, 1� mð Þ 1� pð Þ < 1� p 8m > 0: ð16Þ
The minimal interest rate that the capitalist demands will be lower if the entrepre-
neur can raid (part of) her assets. Intuitively, the threat of raiding idle assets reduces
the expected value of not investing for the capitalist. If the capitalist understands
this, then she still has an incentive to invest in otherwise unattractive activities, since
the return still exceeds her expected costs of being raided.
Similarly, a comparison to the threshold level �A of assets as defined in equation (4)
reveals that A^ < �A:
I � pð1� ð1� pÞmÞRL � A^ < A;
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A^ < �A if
p
ð1� ð1� pÞmÞ > p, 0 > �ð1� pÞm 8m > 0: ð17Þ
Hence, the critical level of assets (collateral) required from the entrepreneur is lower
if the entrepreneur can raid the capitalist. If all entrepreneurs would behave destruc-
tively, capitalists cannot protect their assets by not investing them. This is different
to the previous setting without raiding, where capitalists can protect their assets sim-
ply by not investing into projects. Although raiding is an extreme form of destructive
entrepreneurship and as such represents a special case in our more general model of
destructive entrepreneurship (refer to Sanders and Weitzel [2013] for a detailed
analysis of raiding by potential entrepreneurs), it is particularly relevant in regions
with very weak institutions and/or conflict.
Institutions and Incentives
It follows from our model that institutions are central drivers of entrepreneurial
talent. Entrepreneurs are motivated to make selections based on expected
rewards—that is, their incentives come out of their institutional constraints. The
integral role of reward structures in determining activity has been discussed at length
(Baumol 1990; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991; Acemoglu 1995; Grossman and
Kim 1995) and typically centers on the trade-off between productive and unproduc-
tive forms. Despite divergence on whether reward structures are initially shaped
endogenously or exogenously,7 they always have the potential to become endogen-
ous due to path dependence (for more, see Nunn 2007). This means reward structures
are not only critical determinants of the current allocation of entrepreneurial activity
but also potential determinants of future reward structures (see Acemoglu 1995).
Endogeneity in institutions can arise from the relationship between economic and
political systems (see Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). Entrepreneurs can also directly
and indirectly affect institutions through gains of political power (for more, see
Douhan and Henrekson 2008a). This is one of the many ways through which they
may be able to destroy inputs. Endogenous institutions pose a problem when incen-
tives do not favor productive entrepreneurship and particularly when they favor
destructive entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous for many reasons—among them is the range of
conditions under which they operate. This can lead to the persistence of destructive
entrepreneurship both as a one-time outcome under weak rule of law and as an equi-
librium outcome under persistently weak rule of law (see Proposition 4). Conditions
can vary by country, region, state, and local context. For this reason, destructive
entrepreneurship can become an equilibrium outcome (see Douhan and Henrekson
2008a & b; Desai 2008). First, individuals may respond to incentives with high time
preference. An entrepreneur may be willing to sacrifice future returns for lower
returns today. If he makes a utility calculation of expected gains and losses8 and
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is not confident about transactions tomorrow, he will place a higher premium on
what is possible today. As our model shows, the high discounting of future (produc-
tive) returns can lead to destructive behavior, despite the fact that these entrepre-
neurs have the talent to be productive. Of course, the destructive effects are
marginal when this applies to only one entrepreneur as implied by our two-player
game. However, multiple entrepreneurs not only have a much greater cumulative
economic effect but may also negatively influence the present value of potential
future returns (each other’s discount rates), because of the generally increased
destructive activity in a country. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the long-run
equilibrium tendency under conditions of uncertain political economy is likely
to be toward destructive entrepreneurship if there are a sufficient number of
impatient entrepreneurs.
Implications and Conclusion
We provide this model of destructive entrepreneurship in an attempt to explain the
concept and advance a more comprehensive understanding of the range of entrepre-
neurial activities. Our model yields important directions in four research agendas as
well as critical insights and implications for policy.
Research Agendas
First, significant theoretical work is necessary to understand how destructive
entrepreneurship can be both a process and an outcome (see Douhan and Henrekson
2008). This is related to occupational choice or the lack thereof, in countries with
uncertain political and economic conditions. In many countries, destructive activi-
ties may result from necessity. An important question for further theoretical work
is on the dynamics of raiding, and if resulting suboptimal investments themselves
can become embedded (see Sanders and Weitzel 2013).
Second, although the literature on entrepreneurial allocation and its underlying
determinants is growing, the specific dynamics, causes, and effects of destructive
entrepreneurship remain understudied. Incentives and institutions are increasingly
studied with respect to transforming and strengthening economies, this can be
greatly enhanced by first extending and clarifying the ‘‘furthest point’’ on the
spectrum: destructive entrepreneurship. For example, could an optimal balance of
institutions exist (Acemoglu and Verdier 1998) to discourage entrepreneurial talent
from allocating to undesirable activities? How can deeper insight on historic
processes of institutional existence and change (see Greif and Laitin 2004) shed light
on modern drivers? In this line, country- or region-focused empirical research may
yield important insights on the drivers of destructive entrepreneurship.
Both the preceding research agendas ultimately lead to important empirical
questions, such as measuring the share of destructive entrepreneurship as compared
to other forms of entrepreneurship as well as assessing specific inputs or
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endowments. The importance and difficulty of undertaking empirical research on
this subject should not be underestimated.
A third related research agenda concerns the temporal dimension. Essentially,
destructive entrepreneurship and its share of total entrepreneurial activity may vary
not only according to country-specific factors but also according to the level and
timing of economic development. Perhaps entrepreneurial allocation changes along
with population or demographic trends. Perhaps the allocation of entrepreneurship
varies along an interaction of time and political context. For example, is destructive
entrepreneurship greatest in the five years immediately after the introduction of
reforms or is it lowest at this point? Understanding the potential relevance of time
may shed light on the drivers and outcomes of destructive entrepreneurship and may
contribute to knowledge on the evasive institutional lag in transition economies.
Fourth, direct delineation from this theory is in research on conflict and political
instability, where there are many potential research questions. We consider this
research agenda the most promising extension of our model. As civil conflict and
terrorism are both increasingly recognized to have roots in economic factors, the
potential of entrepreneurship both to help and to hinder stability is key. For example,
how does destructive entrepreneurship affect political stability in regions where
different types of scarcity (see Homer-Dixon 1997) feed into conflict? Does the
allocation of entrepreneurship differ according to different constraints in a region?
To what extent are terrorist activities, including financing, the results of incentives
for destructive entrepreneurship versus ideologically motivated events? The link
between factors related to political stability9 and the allocation of entrepreneurial
talent is a ripe and open area for research. A related question concerns the effect
of terrorism on investment behavior of different economic actors, such as self-
employed farmers (see Singh 2012). Gross domestic product losses up to 60 percent
during a typical conflict (see Collier et al. 2003) could be driven in part by the shift
from productive and unproductive activities to destructive activities. As traditional
attempts to support postconflict countries have not always achieved the intended
results, supporting entrepreneurship offers a great deal of promise if it can be
productive. Empirical research on firms in conflict is growing and is an important
area of inquiry (see, for example, Collier and Duponchel [2012] and Camacho and
Rodriguez [2012]). In addition, the role of informal institutions may be especially
important where conflict is marked by state failure and market failures. A key
question is what institutions exert the greatest influence or offer the most opportu-
nity for gains from change?
Policy Implications
In addition, our model has implications for the practice of economic development
across institutional context. In developing countries, some policies on entrepreneur-
ship have focused on how to increase the share of formal businesses in the econ-
omy—both through supporting the establishment of new businesses and through
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formalization of existing businesses. Our model adds nuances to support a more
comprehensive understanding of activities outside those which can be formalized.
Destructive entrepreneurship may be a larger proportion of total entrepreneurial
activity within a single economy than currently understood: our model proposes that
it coexists with productive entrepreneurship but the actual distribution of activities
remains an open question. This leads to a question more evasive than that of how to
encourage formal entry among private firms: What is the actual distribution of activ-
ities between unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship? A second question is,
how relevant is formality to productive entrepreneurship versus to unproductive and
destructive entrepreneurship? Knowing about formal or informal status does not
necessarily allow us to infer about impact. For example, substantial numbers up to
60 percent of the Asian workforce operate in the informal sector (International Labour
Organization [ILO] 2007), but this information does not allow us to infer much about
the nature of their activities. This has a critical policy implication because it leaves
policy makers with little knowledge about actual effects on the economy. The nature
of activity should be properly understood before attempts at transformation can suc-
ceed. In other words, two countries with the same productive allocation (say, 50 per-
cent) may have vastly different allocations of unproductive and destructive activities
in the remaining 50 percent. In addition, policies aimed at formalizing existing infor-
mal business may not be effective in mitigating destructive entrepreneurship, which
could include illegal activities. For example, people engaged in informal, illegal busi-
ness operations are unlikely to be reached through policies aimed at formal entry due
to the nature of their activities. Economic development policy can thus be refined and
made more effective with insight on the nuances of allocation.
Policy applications are particularly important in the context of conflict. In
countries hosting conflict or recovering from conflict, the formal sector may shrink.
This may be the result of state predation over time or response to institutional
collapse. In this context, two specific situations can benefit from policy direction.
First, countries undergoing current conflict, long-term insurgent or recurring
terrorist activity, or transition of political regime, may be better equipped for conflict
management and the process of stabilization by leveraging effective economic
development policies. Second, one of the major challenges in economic develop-
ment, postconflict reconstruction (Wolfensohn 1999), is further complicated by the
endogenous nature of institutions where destructive entrepreneurship may easily
become institutionalized.
Attempts to predict conflict (see Gurr [1994] for a discussion) may also benefit
from our model. Knowledge about destructive entrepreneurship may be useful in
early warning systems and conflict prevention efforts. Attempts at early warning
consider a combination of factors, which, with the right magnitude and at the right
time, can culminate in conflict. The contributions from using existing economic
measures (e.g, macroeconomic factors, Gini index, measures of inequality, and
measures of poverty and underdevelopment) can benefit from insight on destructive
entrepreneurship, as it is reflective both of institutional pressures and resulting
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economic decision making. For example, tracking the allocation of entrepreneurship
over time may reveal the state of stability and how broader changes (e.g., changes in
leadership and political representation) may directly affect economic activity. The
speed at which the shares of productive and destructive entrepreneurship expand
or contract could be useful in the design of future early warning systems. Thus,
monitoring the allocation of entrepreneurship regularly may be an important tool for
conflict prevention, particularly when it can be matched with other trends such as
poverty, employment, and labor trends.
Understanding how to balance the drivers of destructive entrepreneurship may
help enable more effective governance and contributions from economic develop-
ment policy to both the process and outcomes of stabilization. Time may be a key
element. If the incentives for destructive entrepreneurship are likely to be stronger
in the presence of high time preference, then part of the move toward stability may
include policies aimed at increasing the patience of entrepreneurs. This can be
anything from a basic income grant or food aid to rudimentary financial instruments
that support entrepreneurs in waiting for the medium- and long-term proceeds of
productive projects, thus preventing them from behaving destructively by consum-
ing productive assets in the short run. A basic income grant, for example, is a type of
social security payment to provide for individual basic human needs.10 An example
from the opposite end of the spectrum of development policies are improvements in
often very rudimentary financial markets and risk management, for example,
through offering (easier access to) export insurances, hedging of commodity price,
or exchange rate risks but also by generally increasing the efficiency of formal and
even informal financial transactions. All of these policies can help reduce the dis-
count that entrepreneurs put on their share of future returns, making productive
behavior more attractive than the destructive alternative.
Another related example of policies designed around time preference is specific to
conflict and postconflict areas—that is, the opportunity to commence reintegration
programs concurrently with disarmament programs, rather than a traditional (sequen-
tial) approach. Short-term programs to supplement or provide incomes directly to spe-
cial populations, such as displaced persons or at-risk persons, may be appropriate ways
to support stability while working toward longer-term policies (such as training or
transitioning into employment). While the income provided in these programs may
be used directly for consumption, it can reduce the pressure for income (and increase
patience), thereby weakening incentives for participation in destructive activities
(such as crime, violence, or insurgency). Such programs may ease the path to long-
term, sustained economic recovery, so long as they are designed and implemented
as short-term support. Related to our section on raiding, if youth contribute to instabil-
ity by undertaking destructive activities, why wait until peace is imposed to find ways
for productive economic integration? Providing alternatives for combatants while con-
flict is ongoing may provide incentives that bolster stabilization efforts.
Thus, a value addition of our model is it serves as a platform to connect modern
economic realities with economic development planning and policies. The rapidly
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evolving state of international economic and political relations calls for policy
approaches that can be responsive to the effects of globalization and spillovers:
money, people, finance, technologies, and ideas move and respond quickly to
institutional changes. The existence of entire regions of instability demonstrates the
importance of sound policy. Our model presents a nuanced way to understand
economic development, constant change, and important contextual differences in
developing countries. For example, there are important distinctions between the
needs and allocation of entrepreneurship in India versus Afghanistan. Our model
is relevant for countries that are both poor and unstable and allows the constraints
in a particular economy to be examined. In particular, our model can help explain
the apparent mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and political
instability in low-income countries,11 many of which have hosted major conflict
since 1980 (Wolfensohn 1999).
Our model can enhance understanding of economic activity across institutional
contexts. Although the implications are perhaps more clear for economies hosting
or recovering from conflict, destructive entrepreneurship certainly occurs in coun-
tries across levels of development. In developed countries, the lines between
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurs may be less obvious, although the
latter do exist and can produce significant economic damage, as corporate scandals
like Enron and the financial industry have repeatedly shown. In developing coun-
tries, the trade-off between unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship is per-
haps more obvious but still underresearched. Here, the gains from understanding
and measuring destructive entrepreneurship are high. As we have seen from our
model, the interaction between entrepreneurs and capitalists can become a rela-
tionship embedded with incentives favoring destructive entrepreneurship. The
movement of entrepreneurial talent and destructive entrepreneurship is an urgent
question in research and public policy—a question that can provide relevance
on multiple fronts.
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Notes
1. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) and Baumol (1990) describe similar concepts:
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1991) discussion of ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ and ‘‘rent-
seeking’’ parallels Baumol’s (1990) discussion of ‘‘productive entrepreneurship’’ and
‘‘unproductive entrepreneurship.’’
2. A key question concerns people that are not free to choose due to structural or other bar-
riers. Some models assume that individuals can choose between entrepreneurship and
wage employment. However, very real constraints exist on individual occupational
choice (see Ghatak and Jiang 2002) and, thus, on entrepreneurship, particularly in
developing countries. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny note that ‘‘when they are free to
do so [emphasis added], people choose occupations that offer them the highest returns
on their abilities’’ (1991, 503). In addition, existing models of entrepreneurship may be
appropriate for high-growth and high-technology sectors but simply may not fit many
activities in poor, underdeveloped, and/or politically unstable countries.
3. Throughout this article, we follow the convention in principal–agent models that the
gender of one player (here the entrepreneur) is male and the other player (here the
capitalist) is female.
4. For instance, if the profit is 5, the capitalist’s share of 1 can be interpreted either as a claim
from 20 percent ownership or as a claim from risky debt with a nominal value of 1.
Analogously, a 10 percent return on investment for the capitalist can be interpreted either
as an interest rate on debt or as a return of an equally risky equity investment.
5. Or, the capital intensity if I is interpreted as capital requirements for the activity.
6. These may be different levels of training, different levels of education, skills, market
access, supportive networks, or any other factor that systematically produces heteroge-
neous project returns across the entrepreneurial talent base.
7. Refer to Acemoglu (1995) and Baumol (1990) for more on how reward structures are
shaped, endogenously or exogenously.
8. For a useful related discussion about utility calculations, see Macculloch (2005).
9. See Goldstone (2001) for more on factors related to political instability.
10. Although such an unconditional grant may go toward immediate consumption and not
direct support for an entrepreneurial activity, it may help to reduce the urgency for imme-
diate funds, thereby increasing the present value of productive returns if the opportunity
arises. This may help prepare entrepreneurial talent to approach opportunities productively.
Preliminary empirical evidence for this kind of program comes from Namibia, where a
large-scale pilot project with a basic income grant (BIG) was started in 2004 (with 100
Namibian dollars per person per month). According to a study of the pilot project, the
percentage of those able to get a job or become successfully self-employed increased
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from 44 percent to 55 percent while crime rates fell by 42 percent. A growth in non-BIG
income per capita, from N$118 to N$152, may indicate the start of a demand-induced
economic growth cycle. Also, school attendance increased, and there were no indications
that alcohol-abuse has worsened (BIG Coalition 2009).
11. For a detailed discussion of this relationship, see Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
References
Acemoglu, Daron. 1995. ‘‘Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent.’’ European
Economic Review 39:17–33.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2005. ‘‘Unbundling Institutions.’’ Journal of Political
Economy 113:949–95.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Thierry Verdier. 1998. ‘‘Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation
of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach.’’ The Economics Journal 108:1381–403.
Bates, Robert, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh. 2002. ‘‘Organizing Violence.’’ Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46:599–628.
Basic Income Grant Coalition. 2009. ‘‘Making the Difference! The BIG (Basic Income Grant)
in Namibia.’’ Basic Income Grant Pilot Project Assessment Report. Accessed March 7,
2011. www.bignam.org.
Baumol, William. 1990. ‘‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive.’’
Journal of Political Economy 98:893–921.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1982. ‘‘Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities.’’ Journal
of Political Economy 90:988–1002.
Bowen, Harry P., and Dirk De Clercq. 2008. ‘‘Institutional Context and the Allocation of
Entrepreneurial Effort.’’ Journal of International Business Studies 39:747–67.
Camacho, Adriana, and Catherine Rodriguez. 2012. ‘‘Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in
Colombia.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Collier, Paul, and Marguerite Duponchel. 2012. ‘‘The Economic Legacy of Civil War: Firm-
Level Evidence from Sierra Leone.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas
Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.
Washington, DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. ‘‘On the Economic Causes of Civil War.’’ Oxford
Economic Papers 50:563–73.
Desai, Sameeksha. 2008.‘‘Essays on Entrepreneurship and Postconflict Reconstruction.’’
Doctoral diss., George Mason University: Virginia.
Douhan, Robin, and Magnus Henrekson. 2008a. ‘‘The Political Economy of Entrepreneur-
ship: An Introduction.’’ In The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship Volumes I and
II, edited by Magnus Henreksonand Robin Douhan, xi-xxxi. Douhan Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar.
Douhan, Robin, and Henrekson, Magnus. 2008b. ‘‘Productive and Destructive Entrepreneur-
ship in a Political Economy Framework,’’ Working Paper Series 761, Research Institute of
Industrial Economics.
Desai et al. 39
Zoltán J. Ács - 9781784718046
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/19/2017 11:19:56AM
via communal account
 Global Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Incentives 23
Ghatak, Maitreesh, and Neville Nien Huei Jiang. 2002. ‘‘A Simple Model of Inequality,
Occupational Choice, and Development.’’ Journal of Development Economics 69:205–26.
Goldstone, Jack 2001. ‘‘Demography, Environment and Security.’’ In Environmental
Conflict, edited by Paul Diehland Nils Petter Gleditsch, 84–108. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. ‘‘A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.’’
American Political Science Review 98:633–52.
Grossman, Herschel I., and Minseong Kim. 1995. ‘‘Swords or Ploughshares? A Theory of the
Security of Claims to Property.’’ Journal of Political Economy 103:1275–89.
Gurr, Ted R. 1994. ‘‘Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World
System: 1994 Presidential Address.’’ International Studies Quarterly 38:347–77.
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. 1997. ‘‘Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and
the Real Sector.’’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:663–91.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1997. Environment, Scarcity and Violence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2007. ‘‘In Asia Informal Work Shifts But Remains
Massive.’’ Accessed April 12, 2012. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-
media-centre/insight/WCMS_083603/lang–en/index.htm.
Macculloch, Robert J. 2005. ‘‘Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution,’’ The Journal
of Law and Economics 48:93–123.
Murphy, Kevin, Andre Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1991. ‘‘The Allocation of Talent:
Implications for Growth.’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:503–30.
Murphy, Kevin, Andre Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1993. ‘‘Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly
to Growth?’’ The American Economic Review 83:409–14.
Nunn, Nathan. 2007. ‘‘Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to Its Current
Underdevelopment.’’ Journal of Development Economics 83:157–75.
Sanders, Mark, and Utz Weitzel. 2013. ‘‘Misallocation of Entrepreneurial Talent in Post con-
flict Environments.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 57:41–64.
Singh, Prakarsh. 2012. ‘‘Impact of Terrorism on Investment Decisions of Farmers.’’ Journal
of Conflict Resolution.
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. ‘‘Cooperation, Conflict and Power in the Absence of Property
Rights.’’ American Economic Review 82:720–39.
Sobel, Russell. 2008. ‘‘Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality and the Productivity of Entre-
preneurship.’’ Journal of Business Venturing 23:641–55.
Tirole, Jean. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Urbig, Diemo, Utz Weitzel, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and Arjen van Witteloostuijn. 2012.
‘‘Exploiting Opportunities at all Cost? Entrepreneurial Intent and Externalities.’’ Journal
of Economic Psychology 33:379–93.
Weitzel, Utz, Diemo Urbig, Sameeksha Desai, Mark Sanders, and Zoltan Acs. 2010. ‘‘The
Good, The Bad, and The Talented: Entrepreneurial Talent and Selfish Behaviour.’’
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 76:64–81.
Wolfensohn, James. 1999. ‘‘Entering the 21st Century: The Challenges for Development.’’
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 354:1943–48.
40 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(1)
Zoltán J. Ács - 9781784718046
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/19/2017 11:19:56AM
via communal account
